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BEST PRACTICES AND THE STATE OF INFORMATION SECURITY
KEVIN CRONIN*
INTRODUCTION
In a book you might have read, The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Ga-
laxy, l researchers from a pan-dimensional, hyper-intelligent race of beings
construct deep-thought super computers. They enlist the second greatest
computer of all time to calculate the ultimate answer to the universe. After
seven and one half million years of computations, this computer comes up
with the answer, which is "42."2 The person who asked the question re-
sponded, "42? What kind of answer is that?" and the computer replied,
"Well, I checked it very thoroughly, and that quite definitely is the answer.
I think the problem, to be quite honest, is that you have never really known
the actual question to ask."'3
With that in mind, I am not going to try to give the ultimate answer to
data security because I do not think there is an ultimate answer to data se-
curity. If you asked a deep-thought computer what is the ultimate answer to
data security, it would, of course, give you one of these dead answers like
"42" and would probably chastise you for asking the wrong question. There
is no ultimate answer for data security. The closest set of answers will
probably be found in the building process.
* Kevin Cronin has worked with pharmaceutical and information technology companies for
over 20 years, as a principal and consultant, and is a Senior Fellow at the Thomas Jefferson University
School of Population Health. Before his current positions, he was the CEO of Praxeon, Inc., a health
informatics company providing drug discovery and e-health services to biopharmaceutical companies,
CROs, health insurers and other sectors of the healthcare industry, and was a senior partner in the law
firm Blank Rome LLP, where he advised companies in connection with mergers and acquisitions and
technology matters.
Prior to practicing law, Kevin designed software and conducted research in pulmonology
medicine and respiratory devices. He is the author of Data Security and Privacy Law (Thomson-
Reuters/West Group), a comprehensive treatise on health IT and Internet law. Kevin received his law
degree from Washington University and his undergraduate degree in biological sciences from the
University of Chicago.
1. DOUGLAS ADAMS, HITCHHIKER'S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY (1979).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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I. CORPORATE DATA SECURITY-AN INTRODUCTION
A. Corporate Data Security as a Corporate Governance Issue
Data security was once the domain of IT departments. However, what
has happened in the past several years is that new regulations, statutes,
agency enforcement actions, and private litigation actions have made data
security a core concern for almost all corporations. This may be especially
true for public corporations, but data security concerns extend even to pri-
vate corporations. Security is no longer only an IT issue; rather, it is also a
corporate governance issue critical to the future of corporations. 4
Another thing that has happened in the past few years-maybe after
the beginning of the shift of data security toward being more of a core cor-
porate issue-is a movement toward establishing concrete standards for
data security. This is a slow process, and we are not there yet. However, we
are moving towards minimum standards of care. I will describe a little bit
about this movement and where I think it is with regard to legal standards
for data security. What I am going to try to do is elucidate just what these
standards are. What does a company have to do with respect to data securi-
ty and where is the bright line? Is there a bright line? What does a company
have to do to discharge the statutory obligations for data security?
B. What is Corporate Data Security?
Data security means employing security measures to protect assets
such as data, people, and infrastructure against threats. It is critical to real-
ize that there is no such thing as absolute security in data security. Essen-
tially, the only way to protect a computer from Internet threats is to unplug
it, both from a telecommunication connection and from the wall. That
would make your computer secure but, obviously, useless.
If we are plugged in, we are always going to have to live with some
level of data security that is not absolute; the only question is whether we
are more secure or less secure. Because there is no absolute security, the
4. For a discussion of corporate governance issues, see generally, Carter G. Bishop, The Deonto-
logical Significance of Nonprofit Corporate Governance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without
a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REv. 701, 727-57 (2008); Alan Dignam & Michael Galanis, Corporate
Governance and the Importance of Macroeconomic Context, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 201 (2008);
Yair Listokin, Interpreting Empirical Estimates of the Effect of Corporate Governance, 10 AM. L. &
ECON. REv. 90 (2008); Richard E. Mendales, Intensive Care for the Public Corporation: Securities
Law, Corporate Governance, and the Reorganization Process, 91 MARQ. L. REv. 979 (2008); Houman
B. Shadab, Innovation and Corporate Governance: The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. &
EMP. L. 955 (2008); Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management and
Corporate Governance, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571 (2008).
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standards that I am going to introduce do not require a guarantee of securi-
ty. The three measures involved in data security are: (1) technical meas-
ures; (2) physical measures; and (3) administrative measures.
Technical security measures are safeguards incorporated into hard-
ware, software, and related devices. Among other things, they are designed
to improve system availability and to provide access control. On the other
hand, physical security measures are those that are intended to protect tang-
ible items such as the actual computers from destruction through real-space
immobilization or damage. Finally, administrative measures are procedural
management controls that an administrator or auditor uses to provide pro-
tection for a network. Security is all about defining targets, goals, and
processes 5 for achieving goals in a way that best implements and dis-
charges data security duties under statutory and common law.
Similarly, three subcategories exist under each of the main security
measure categories just discussed: (1) preventative measures; (2) detective
measures; and (3) reactive measures. Preventive measures include firewalls
and antivirus software. Detective measures involve figuring out when you
are being attacked by using methods such as recording attacks, intrusion
detection, and port scans. 6 Reactive measures involve reacting once there is
a breach of security or threatened breach of security and include measures
such as shutting down systems and getting law enforcement involved.
The types of attacks and threats that are part of security involve theft,
damage, destruction, or interference with the operation of the computer or
network. Those things can be "acts of god" or unintentional acts such as
natural disasters, infrastructure failures, hurricanes, and power outages.
These attacks and threats can also be intentional acts like intentional de-
struction of computer equipment, damage from malware, viruses, spyware,
or worms, and denials-of-service attacks. The last types of threats are so-
cial, or people-related, threats. These come from individuals directly at-
tacking either the network or computer system. An example of such a
social threat is an employee compromising or stealing credit card data.
7
5. For a discussion of the basics of information security, see generally ROSS J. ANDERSON,
SECURITY ENGINEERING: A GUIDE TO BUILDING DEPENDABLE DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS (2001).
6. Port scans are queries sent to servers to receive information about the extent of security on the
system and what services are running. See ZDNet, Port Scan: Definition, http://dictionary.zdnet.com/
index.php?d=port+scan (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
7. For a discussion of insider/outsider threats, see generally Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke,
Distributed Security: Preventing Cybercrime, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 659, 681
(2005); Jennifer A. Chandler, Security in Cyberspace: Combatting Distributed Denial of Service At-
tacks, I U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 231 (2004); Michael L. Rustad, The Negligent Enablement of Trade
Secret Misappropriation, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 455 (2006); Karen Sepura,
Note, Economic Espionage: The Front Line of a New World Economic War, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L.
20L1
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Social threats also include an individual who is implementing one of the
technical threats mentioned above.
What are the goals of data security? They are five-fold: availability,
access, confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. 8 Every data security
process has some variant of these five goals. These goals are reflected in
the framework of the legislation that dictates data security standards.
II. THE EMERGING LAW OF INFORMATION SECURITY
A growing number of federal and state 9 statutes govern data security.
These statutes prescribe details regarding the rules for data security stan-
dards. 10 Contractual obligations are another source of data security stan-
dards, as nearly all corporate transactions include requirements to
safeguard data. Such contractual obligations insure that industry best stan-
dards or best practices are being used in collecting, safeguarding, and de-
stroying data. Finally, courts are beginning to incorporate negligence law
into data security litigation.
A. Statutes
Until recently, most laws addressing information security stated that
companies needed to use reasonable standards to safeguard data, but, they
did not go any further. Consequently, those statutes only gave a general
prescription for data security. Today, some new laws like the Children's
Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 11 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLBA), 12 the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
&COM. 127 (1998).
8. See ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 120.
9. See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Security Breach Notification Laws,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breachlaws.htm (listing current data breach notification
statutes from forty-four states) (last visited Dec. 19, 2009).
10. See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH.
L. REv. 913, 918 (2007) (arguing in favor of creating a coordinated response architecture and develop-
ing the elements of such an approach with a "coordinated response agent" that oversees steps for auto-
matic consumer protection and heightens mitigation).
11. For a discussion of the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), see generally
Joseph A. Zavaletta, COPPA, Kids, Cookies & Chat Rooms: We're From the Government and We're
Here to Protect Your Children, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 249, 253-55 (2001);
Danielle J. Garber, Note, COPPA: Protecting Children's Personal Information on the Internet, 10 J.L.
& POL'Y 129, 153-60 (2001); Melanie L. Hersh, Note, Is COPPA a Cop Out? The Child Online Priva-
cy Protection Act as Proof That Parents, Not Government, Should Be Protecting Children 's Interests on
the Internet, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1831, 1853-56 (2001); Joshua Warmund, Note, Can COPPA
Work? An Analysis of the Parental Consent Measures in the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act,
II FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 189, 194-201 (2000).
12. For a discussion of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), see generally R. Bradley McMa-
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(HIPAA), 13 and other statutes such as the FTC Act 14 and the Homeland
Security Act, 15 are moving toward defining specific process-based stan-
dards for data security. These new standards are not only about using rea-
sonable technical standards in a company's security determination; they are
also about the adequacy of the specific process by which a company goes
through to safeguard or to establish data security. The statutes are begin-
ning to define information security specifically, not just generally. They
address the protection of information systems from unauthorized access,
use, disclosure, disruption, and the preservation of integrity, confidentiality,
availability, and proper authentication. 
16
In the future, we will probably hear more about process based securi-
ty; security through obscurity 17 is finally dead or should be dead. Technical
hon, Note, After Billions Spent to Comply with HIPAA and GLBA Privacy Provisions, Why Is Identity
Theft the Most Prevalent Crime in America?, 49 VILL. L. REV. 625, 633-38 (2004); Jason Shroff, Note,
California: A Privacy Statute Meets the GLBA & FCRA, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 223, 226-27 (2005).
13. For a discussion of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), see
generally Cicely N. Tingle, Developments in HIPAA and Health Information Technology, 3 I/S: J. L. &
POL'Y FOR INTFO. SOc'Y 677, 678-81 (2008); Kirsten N. Arnold, Note, Getting Payment for a Clean Bill
of Health: Reconciling the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA "') with the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA ") for Health-Care Debt Collection, 93 IOwA L. REV.
605, 611-14 (2008); Joshua D.W. Collins, Special Project Note, Toothless HIPAA: Searching for a
Private Right of Action to Remedy Privacy Rule Violations, 60 VAND. L. REV. 199, 200-03 (2007);
Dustin C. George, Comment, HIPAA, the Privacy Rule, and the Texas Public Information Act: How
Texas Health and Human Services Agencies Should Referee the Game of Exception Ping-Pong That
These Laws Play, 8 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 277, 280-82 (2007); Daniel J. Oates, Comment, HIPAA
Hypocrisy and the Case for Enforcing Federal Privacy Standards Under State Law, 30 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 745, 748-50 (2007).
14. For a discussion of the FTC Act, see generally Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, On the
Same Page: Federal Banking Agency Enforcement of the FTC Act to Address Unfair and Deceptive
Practices by Banks, 58 Bus. LAW. 1243 (2003); Michael A. Rabkin, Comment, When Consumer Fraud
Crosses the International Line: The Basis for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the FTC Act, 101 Nw.
U. L. REV. 293, 297-99 (2007).
15. For a discussion of the Homeland Security Act, see generally Karen E. Jones, Comment, The
Effect of the Homeland Security Act on Online Privacy and the Freedom of Information Act, 72 U. CIN.
L. REV. 787, 790-93 (2003).
16. See, e.g., Catherine Guthrie & Brittan Mitchell, The Swinton Six: The Impact of State v.
Swinton on the Authentication of Digital Images, 36 STETSON L. REV. 661 (2007) (discussing the legal
meaning of authentication); William J. Haddad, Authentication and Identification of E-Mail Evidence,
96 ILL. B.J. 252, 253-54 (2008) (same); Ritu Singh, Two-Factor Authentication: A Solution to Times
Past or Present? The Debate Surrounding the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Security Safeguards Rule and the
Methods of Risk Assessment and Compliance, 2 IS: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFORMATION Soc'Y 761 (2006)
(same).
17. See, e.g., Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate Informa-
tion Security, and Securities Regulations, 3 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 129 (2005) (discussing security
through obscurity); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH. U. L.R.. 529, 538 n.39
(2007) (same); Peter P. Swire, Privacy and Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism, 51 VILL. L.
REV. 951 (2006) (same); Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security and Competitive Reasons:
Open Source, Proprietary Software, and Governmental Systems, 42 Hous. L. REV. 1333 (2006) (same);
Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values,73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1711 (2005) (same).
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standards and legal standards can be similar, but what companies are doing
technically is not necessarily the same as the legal standard. Similarly, the
legal standard is not always reflective of the state-of-the-art technical stan-
dard. 18 There is, however, a significant overlap between the technical and
the legal standard, and we are seeing a parallelism between the process-
based paradigms of data security show up in law. 19 For example, the
GLBA has a very process-based prescription for data security.
20
B. Contract
Organizations engaged in computer processing frequently outsource
their computer operations; accordingly, they will need an agreement to
guarantee a certain level service. Often, these agreements include provi-
sions dictating data security standards, and some courts have held compa-
nies to these standards and awarded hefty damages where the standards
were not met. For example, Verizon was sued for system outages that were
precipitated by the "Slammer worm" a few years ago. 21 The Slammer
worm22 shut down Verizon's operations in some sectors of the East coast,
and damages were awarded for these outages under existing customer con-
tracts. Verizon said that these outages were not its fault because they were
hit by the worm.23 However, Verizon waited six months to implement criti-
cal system patches that would have eliminated the vulnerability to the
worm, 2 4 something the court deemed a breach of the service-level agree-
ment.25 These service-level agreements are commonly being negotiated
now, but data security is not absolute. Inevitably, someone may be able to
compromise your system, and there is no guarantee that you will have ab-
18. See Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, supra note 17, at 541 (discussing the conflict between
the legal standard and new technology).
19. See Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities, supra note 17, at 134.
20. See, e.g., Thomas J. Smedinghoff, The Emerging Law of Data Security: A Focus on the Key
Legal Trends, 934 PLI/PAT 13 (2008) (discussing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley security regulations).
21. See, e.g., Reply Comments of Verizon Virginia Inc. on its Petition For a Waiver of Certain
Service Quality Results Measured under the Performance Assurance Plan for January 2003,
http://www.scc.virginia.gov/puc/comp/ccimom/ccimomfiles/vrespslam.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2009)
(discussing Verizon's problems with Slammer).
22. See, e.g., Susan Landau, National Security on the Line, 4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 409
(2006) (discussing the Slammer worm); Meiring de Villiers, Opinionated Software, 10 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 269 (2008) (same); see generally Richard W. Downing, Thinking Through Sentencing in
Computer Hacking Cases: Did the U.S. Sentencing Commission Get it Right?, 76 MiSS. L.J. 923 (2007)
(discussing hacking worms).
23. See Reply Comments, supra note 21.
24. See id.
25. For a discussion of Verizon's patching time table, see Erin E. Kenneally, The Byte Stops
Here: Duty and Liability for Negligent Security, http://www.stanford.edu/class/msande91si/www-




Another interesting case is the Pharmatrack26 case, which involved a
website search engine vendor that provided services to pharmaceutical
companies. Pharmatrack collected data that it should not have been collect-
ing, and a class-action lawsuit ensued. A number of the pharmaceutical
company defendants pointed to the disclaimers and specific security re-
quirements of the vendor's contract, which explicitly restricted the vendor
from collecting personally identifiable information. 27 The court used the
language of this agreement to support a motion for summary judgment on
behalf of the pharmaceutical companies.28
C. Negligence
An interesting theory of possible data security liability is negligence. 29
We are seeing more interest in suing companies under negligence theories
for violation of a duty of care and a breach of data security standards. The
elements of a negligence case, of course, are duty, 30 breach, 31 causation, 32
26. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 12 (lst Cir. 2003).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 17.
29. See, e.g., John S. Gray & Richard 0. Faulk, "Negligence in the Air? ": Should "'Alternative
Liability" Theories Apply in Lead Paint Litigation?, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 147 (2008) (discussing
alternative negligence liability); Michelle M. Mello & David M. Studdert, Deconstructing Negligence:
The Role of Individual and System Factors in Causing Medical Injuries, 96 GEO. L.J. 599 (2007) (dis-
cussing negligence); Perry A. Zirkel & John H. Clark, School Negligence Case Law Trends, 32 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 345 (2008) (same); Brian M. Serafin, Current Development, Comparative Fault and Contributo-
ry Negligence as Defenses in Attorney Breach of Fiduciary Duty Cases, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 993
(2008) (same).
30. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Shielding Duty: How Attending to
Assumption of Risk, Attractive Nuisance, and Other "Quaint" Doctrines Can Improve Decisionmaking
in Negligence Cases, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 329 (2006) (discussing negligence duty); David Hunter &
James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate Change Litigation,155 U. PA. L.
REv. 1741, 1744 (2007) (same); Faith J. Jackson, A Streetcar Named Negligence in a City Called New
Orleans-A Duty Owed, A Duty Breached, A Sovereign Shield, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REv.557, 557
(2006) (same); Nils Jansen, Duties and Rights in Negligence: A Comparative and Historical Perspec-
tive on the European Law of Extracontractual Liability, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 443 (2004).
31. See, e.g., Patrick J. Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law:
Descriptive Theory and the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1039, 1041 (2001) (discussing breach in
negligence); William B. L. Little, "It is Much Easier to Find Fault with Others, Than to be Faultless
Ourselves ": Contributory Negligence as a Bar to a Claim for Breach of the Implied Warranty of Mer-
chantability, 30 CAMPBELL L. REv. 81 (2007) (same); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Ex-
tending Learned Hand's Negligence Formula to Information Security Breaches, 3 1/S: J. L. & POL'Y
FOR INFORMATION SOC'Y 237 (2007) (same).
32. See e.g., Clarence Morris, Duty. Negligence and Causation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 189 (1952)
(discussing negligent causation); Paul Homer, Comment, Invisible Injury Negligence Cases - Proving
Causation Among Multiple-Source Polluters: A State-by-State Survey of the Law for New England and
a Proposalfor a New Causation Framework, 3 PIERCE L. REV. 75 (2004) (same).
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and damages. 33 However, the economic loss doctrine 34 prevents a plaintiff
from receiving an award of damages for non-physical injury and this doc-
trine often acts as a bar in data-loss cases.
Another problem when using the negligence theory in data security
litigation is articulating the appropriate standard of care. 35 What goes into a
comprehensive data security program? How do you assess the risk? How
do you plan? How do you develop security measures? In the end, you have
to continuously review and revise the program-the key is evolution. The
process has to evolve; it has to be dynamic.
As mentioned above, there is a distinction between technical standards
and legal standards, but there is an overlap as well. Statutes are starting to
be modeled after technical standards. A company violates technical stan-
dards for data security at its own peril because these technical standards
might be the standards that apply under a statute or under principals of
negligence. 36 Particularly when the negligence-per-se doctrine 37 is applied,
violation of a statutory standard could lead to a negligence action; this is
true even if the statue does not describe a private right of action.38 How do
technical standards come into play? For example, Visa and Mastercard
have what are called "PCI Data Security" guidelines.39 Banks, vendors, and
retailers are being held responsible for violation of the PCI guidelines.40
The guidelines are fairly rigorous and can carry steep penalties for failing
to abide by them.
The complicated nature of these questions becomes evident in the real
world. One of my clients, a large national retailer, came to be known, to the
company's chagrin, for losing approximately 400,000 credit card num-
33. See, e.g., Phillip M. Kannan, A New Approach to Defining and Computing Comparative
Negligence Damages, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 173 (1992) (discussing negligent damages); Kevin L.
Austin, Note, Punitive Damages in Negligence Cases: The Conflicting Standards, 60 MO. L. REV. 693
(1995).
34. See, e.g., Ralph C. Anzivino, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Distinguishing Economic Loss
From Non-Economic Loss, 91 MARQ. L. REv. 1081 (2008) (discussing the economic loss doctrine).
35. See, e.g., Sande L. Buhai, Act Like a Lawyer, Be Judged Like a Lawyer: The Standard of Care
for the Unlicensed Practice of Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 87 (discussing standards of care); Drew Millar,
Note, Judicially Reducing the Standard of Care: An Analysis of the Bad Faith/Gross Misjudgment
Standard in Special Education Discrimination, 96 KY. L.J. 711 (2008) (same),
36. See Andrew E. Costa, Negligence Per Se Theories in Pharmaceutical & Medical Devices
Litigation, 57 ME. L. REV. 51, 81 (2005).
37. See, e.g., id. (discussing negligence per se); Caroline Forell, Statutory Torts, Statutory Duty
Actions, and Negligence Per Se: What's the Difference?, 77 OR. L. REV. 497 (1998) (same).
38. See Costa, supra note 36, at 53; Forrell, supra note 37, at 525.
39. See, e.g., PCI Compliance Guide: A Five Step Guide for Gaining PCI Compliance,





bers-potentially triggering instances of identity theft. They received a lot
of bad publicity. In this case, the question was whether the retailer had a
duty not to collect certain information. Hackers-probably sitting in the
parking lot or someplace close to their buildings-hacked into the main
transaction processing systems of this client and downloaded a large
amount of credit card information.
When you swipe a credit card, information that you do not see is
transferred. It is not just your name, the expiration date, and the credit card
number; there are all kinds of authorization code data on that strip. Some
additional information used for verification and approval purposes was not
supposed to be collected by this company; but this company, apparently in
violation of the Visa PCI Standards, actually collected and retained this
data. Because of this retention, the hackers had all the data needed to print
actual credit cards. Naturally, litigation arose because credit card holders
lost a significant amount of money as a result of this incident.
III. CONCLUSION
Cases involving liability for data breaches are just beginning to find
their way into the court system. In the coming years, many of these issues
will require much greater attention. The United States will need to move
from a fragmented approach towards data security and privacy standards,
towards a more comprehensive set of standards with new penalties and
effective enforcement in order to better reflect the inherent value of person-
al data in today's global marketplace.
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